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Abstract This article provides a concise overview of the history of scholarship on
solidarity in Europe and North America. While recent decades have seen an increase
in conceptual and scholarly interest in solidarity in North America and other parts of
the Anglo-Saxon world, the concept is much more strongly anchored in Europe.
Continental European politics in particular have given rise to two of the most
influential traditions of solidarity, namely, socialism and Christian ethics. Solidarity
has also guided important public instruments and institutions in Europe (e.g.,
welfare, healthcare, etc.). Despite the much stronger affinity of continental Euro-
pean societies to solidaristic thinking, we argue that solidarity has much to offer for
addressing societal challenges on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond. After
proposing a working definition of solidarity that highlights its utility for guiding
policy and practice, we give an example of how a solidarity-based perspective can
shape instruments for the governance of data use.
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Introduction: the roots of solidarity
Solidarity is gaining currency. Against the background of global economic crises,
climate change, and violent conflicts, calls for solidarity are becoming louder and
more frequent. Appeals to global solidarity, solidarity with refugees, or solidarity in
protecting our environment play more important roles in theory and practice.
But what is solidarity? The scholarship on solidarity is diverse, and so are
contemporary understandings of the term. Solidarity is used in different contexts, to
support different goals, and with many different meanings. The one thing that most
works on solidarity have in common is that they treat solidarity as something pro-
social. Solidarity is portrayed as contributing positively to the social fabric of
society, or enhancing social cohesion. Beyond this small common denominator
there is no uniformity in how the notion of solidarity is used. Some authors see
solidarity as an emotion [1], others as a moral ideal [2], as a ‘natural’ characteristic
of groups or societies [3], or as a political idea [4]. Still others see it as an empty
label, and some regard it as an attack on individual autonomy [5].
One reason for the under-determination of the notion of solidarity is the
concept’s patterned history in Western thought, without the continuity of debate and
systematic development that other terms have had, such as justice, responsibility,
freedom, or liberty. One of the earliest uses of the term solidarity was within Roman
law, where the phrase in solidum referred to something that was owed by more than
one person, or owed to two or more people who were joint creditors [3, 6]. An
explicit understanding of the term emerged only in the early 18th century with the
increasing use and currency of solidarite´ during the French Revolution. From there,
the idea of solidarity spread beyond the borders of France, especially into Germany
and England, where it was taken up prominently by socialist and workers’
movements [7]. The idea of solidarity also underpinned early trade union
developments and has played an important role in Marxist and socialist rhetoric
to achieve mutual support amongst all workers, often with the distinguishing feature
of disregarding national borders.
The work of one of the ‘fathers of sociology’, Auguste Comte, greatly increased
the visibility of the term ‘solidarity’ and solidified its importance in the wider field
of the social sciences. He envisaged solidarity as a remedy for the increasing
individualisation and atomisation of society [8]. Comte’s work on solidarity has
influenced most of the scholarship on solidarity after him, including E´mile
Durkheim, whose distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity is still one
of the standard reference points within scholarship on solidarity [9].
Another important field contributing to the early development of solidaristic
ideas and uses of the term was religious thought. The Catholic notion of solidarity,
for example, with its strong roots in Thomas Aquinas’s work, emphasised
community and fellowship between all human beings. This type of solidarity
captured an important element that continues to influence contemporary under-
standings of solidarity, namely, the idea of fellowship of people who recognise
relevant similarities between one another. It sets solidarity apart from charity, for
example, where action is based upon differences between people and not on what
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they see as binding them together. In other words, charity is based on an
asymmetrical relationship between those who are in need and those who have
enough resources to give something to the former. Although there are different
nuances to the specific meaning of solidarity in different Christian traditions, and
additional ones in non-Christian faiths [10–13], in all religious traditions, the notion
of solidarity is connected to discussions of social justice, the fellowship of all beings
(or all believers) created in the image of God, and assistance to those in need. In
other words, in religious contexts solidarity takes the role of a God given moral
imperative to assist others in their quests for social justice, and more generally, for
leading a good life.
This very short historical overview highlights several important elements of the
meaning of solidarity that appear, in different guises, in each of the contexts and
traditions. They are also still relevant today. These are: a sense of being bound
together, e.g., by sharing similar characteristics or circumstances; mutual assistance
and help, particularly in situations of hardships; symmetric relationships between
those engaged in solidaristic practices at the moment of enacting solidarity (i.e.,
despite other aspects of their lives not being equal or even similar); and a link to
personal and collective wellbeing.
In the remainder of the article, we consider the discussions of solidarity in
continental Europe and North America respectively. We argue that the marginal role
that solidarity has played in North American theory and politics is due to the
political history of the continent, and—in the 20th century—to the association of the
term with a particular party politics that was diametrically opposed to the liberal
rhetoric in North America. We then introduce our own working definition of
solidarity which, we argue, enhances the utility of the term for empirical analysis
and policy making, and at the same time, frees the concept from its partisan political
connotation (without rendering it apolitical). To illustrate that such an understand-
ing of solidarity can indeed help to guide policy and practice, we present a
governance framework for data governance that was developed on the basis of a
solidaristic framework. A solidarity-based approach, we argue, has much to offer on
both sides of the Atlantic, and in fact, globally. In times of economic, political, and
ecological crisis, solidarity is needed more than ever.
Solidarity in continental Europe
As has become apparent in the previous section, the concept of solidarity is rooted
in Europe [7, 14]. First of all, solidarity has a distinctly European heritage in the
sense that both its Christian and its socialist legacies emerged from social and
historical configurations in Europe from the 18th century onwards. Some ethicists
and theorists in fact continue to see solidarity most strongly anchored in Europe
[15–20]. One of the most explicit voices is Hans-Martin Sass, who argued:
The principle of solidarity is a notion that is not easy for those in the Anglo-
American philosophical tradition to understand. A richer notion than either
social or legal reciprocity among freely contracting individuals, it is both
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presupposed by the sphere of self-interested social interaction, because it is a
personal virtue, and complementary of that sphere, insofar as it is a principle
of social morality, justifying institutions of social justice and welfare. [21,
pp. 367–368]
Indeed, solidarity has played a larger and more explicit role in the institutional-
isation of health and social care within Europe than outside. It is also often seen as
characteristic of a particularly European understanding of welfare provided by
public actors in the 20th century [22–24].
Matti Ha¨yry, for example, also regards both precaution and solidarity as
particularly (continental) European values vis-a`-vis the ‘American ‘‘autonomy and
justice’’ approach, which is often seen as overemphasising the role of individuals as
consumers of health services’ [17, p. 199]. For him, other important differences
between European and North American bioethics are, first, that Europeans tend to
cherish additional values that go beyond ‘hedonism and egoism’, and second, that
seemingly shared values such as autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-
maleficence are understood and enacted in different ways [16].
In contrast, discussing the four seminal principles from Beauchamp and
Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics [25], among others, Floris Tomasini
warns of ‘spending too much time defining our principles in opposition to the
Americans’ [20, p. 4].1 This, he argues, could put Europeans ‘in danger of looking
insecure and creating a ‘‘resistance identity’’,2 further legitimating the orthodoxy of
the four principles’ [20, p. 4]. Tomasini then puts forward a set of values (not
principles) that he considers particularly European: inclusivity and scope, partic-
ularity and context, multiplicity and rigor, deep questioning, harmony, consensus
and disagreement, and pluralism [20, pp. 5–6].
Solidarity in the Anglo Saxon world
Despite solidarity being firmly anchored in continental Europe, Anglo-American
authors have made important contributions to its conceptual understanding. Richard
Rorty’s work on solidarity is among the best known. Rorty argued against an
understanding of solidarity as a universal, global concept, and against one that is
based on ‘recognition of one another’s common humanity’ in any given, fixed, or
general sense [2, p. 191]. Instead he proposed to see solidarity as something that has
to be continuously recreated and achieved by overcoming difference between
strangers, ‘by imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow
sufferers’ [2, p. xvi]. In other words, solidarity is something that requires continuous
effort.
Other Anglo-American philosophers who have discussed solidarity systemati-
cally include HLA Hart [29], Max Pensky [30], and David Wiggins [31, 32].
Solidarity has also played a role in the debate between liberal philosophers (most
1 See also [26, 27].
2 Tomasini cites Manuel Castells [28] here.
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prominently, John Rawls), and those who have been criticising some of the tenets of
liberal political philosophy since the 1970s. The latter group, which includes
Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer, has been termed ‘commu-
nitarians’ (a label that some of the proponents of this group have always rejected).
The latter debate, in turn, underlies the work of communitarian philosophers of
medicine, such as Richard Tauber or Daniel Callahan, who stress the significance of
group solidarity to balance out the perceived overemphasis on individualism in
much of modern medicine and medical ethics [33–35]. Recently, the potential of
solidarity to aide the implementation of universal concepts such as human rights,
and its role as a foundational concept in public health, are being discussed, rather
controversially, by a diverse group of Anglo-American authors (e.g., [4, 36–39]).
In addition to these discussions in moral and political philosophy, solidarity has
also played a role in Anglo-American contributions by social and political scientists,
social historians, economists, and others [40–47]. It must be stressed, however, that
all these fields have seen an increase in works on solidarity towards the end of the
20th and particularly the beginning of the 21st century. Overall, and if considered
against the attention that concepts such as justice, equality, etc. have commanded in
the 20th century, solidarity has played a marginal role in Anglo-American thought,
and very little if any role as a guide for practice and policy. It is noteworthy also that
solidarity was not appealed to in support of the Affordable Care Act introduced in
2010. Only very recently has it started to step out of the dark, and is gaining more
interest and traction.
A fresh look at solidarity in the 21st century
In a report commissioned by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics [48], and in response
to the different and often conflicting understandings of solidarity in the literature, the
authors of this article have developed a working definition of solidarity. It is based on
an extensive analysis of earlier understandings of solidarity. Since the first iteration
of our own working definition of solidarity in 2011, we have expanded and revised it
on several occasions following helpful feedback from colleagues (e.g., [39, 49, 50])
and insights obtained from applying it to practical contexts [51–53]. In its most
elementary form, we understand solidarity as an enacted commitment to carry the
‘costs’ (financial, social, emotional, and other contributions) of assisting others with
whom a person or persons recognise similarity in a relevant respect [54].
Six qualifiers are in place. First, we understand solidarity first and foremost as a
practice, that is, as purposeful engagement with the world [55, p. 4]. Solidarity is
thus something that is enacted, not merely felt or thought; it is not an abstract
concept. This means that analyses of solidarity need to pay careful attention to the
context of a specific situation, including the policies, relations, and related practices
that enable solidaristic practice.
Second, by ‘costs’, we refer to any contribution (e.g., in terms of time, effort,
emotional investments, or money) that people make to assist others. Small things,
such as giving up our own comfort to offer somebody a seat on the bus, count as
‘costs’ as much as big things, such as donating an organ or paying into a solidaristic
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healthcare system. That people accept such costs for the sake of helping others when
practicing solidarity does not mean that they cannot, at the same time, also benefit
themselves. It is only when self-interest is the main motivation that we do not
consider the resulting practice as solidaristic.
Third, according to our definition, people practice solidarity with others with
whom they recognise similarity in a relevant respect. This requirement is met if a
person (or persons) considers herself to have something in common with the others
who matter in a specific situation. Two things are important to note here. One is that
the context of a specific practical situation determines the criteria of relevance. In a
situation where a person offers to help a colleague study for a much feared exam
because she knows what it is like to be anxious prior to an exam, this anxiety is the
similarity in the relevant respect that gives rise to her solidaristic practice. That the
two people in our example are different in many other respects—e.g., in religious or
political beliefs—is irrelevant for the practice of solidarity in this situation. Thus,
our understanding of solidarity does not assume that people are all essentially
similar and that differences do not matter. On the contrary, solidaristic practice
regularly takes place in a context of stark difference between persons; it takes place
despite these differences. But it is the relevant similarity that people perceive
between themselves and others that gives rise to the solidaristic action (and that we
mean when we speak of a symmetrical relationship at the moment of practicing
solidarity).
The other important thing to note is that the relevant similarity that a person
perceives between herself and another is entirely subjective; we do not believe that
people have objective characteristics that are, or should be, recognised as things that
bind people together. To stick with our aforementioned example, a person’s offer to
help her anxious colleague could just as well not recognise the relevant similarity
and not enact solidarity if, for example, she were to focus on what sets her apart
from her colleague. The colleague may belong to a social elite that she despises, or
perhaps the colleague is very religious, while Lin is staunchly atheist. What people
recognise as a relevant similarity is subjective, but not arbitrary. Political discourses
can make it more or less likely that individuals perceive similarities rather than
differences. A political discourse that foregrounds how much additional public
money is spent specifically on immigrants fosters a situation in which people start to
see immigrants as different from them. All that they share in common moves to the
background. In contrast, a political discourse that highlights how hard most
immigrants work to build a decent living and to contribute to society in their new
homes is conducive to people focusing on the similarities.
Fourth, in order to focus discussion on the level on which solidaristic practices
take place—ranging from interpersonal to being part of the ‘fabric of society’—we
distinguish between three tiers of solidarity. The first tier of solidarity refers to
solidaristic practice between individual people. Our vignette of a student providing
help to her colleague is an example of solidarity at this level. If practices of
solidarity between people are so common in a given context or community that they
become something ‘normal’, then we speak of second tier solidarity. If the values or
principles enacted and emerging through group or community-based practices in
this manner solidify further and become written into contractual, legal, or
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administrative norms, then we have instances of third tier solidarity. The
relationship between the three tiers is such that solidaristic norms and provisions
at the third tier have often emerged out of initially more informal practices of
solidarity at the interpersonal (first tier) or communal or group level (second tier).
But of course, not all inter-personal practices at the first tier actually solidify into
practices and norms at the second and third tiers. In societies where discursive,
political, and economic structures emphasise and foster concern for others, and
where the wellbeing of individuals is seen as closely connected to the wellbeing of
others, these structures provide the ‘glue’ between the three tiers. They provide the
background conditions for solidarity to grow and proliferate. If such structures are
not in place, then even though solidaristic practice at each of the tiers may emerge,
they would hang ‘in thin air’. In such a situation solidaristic practices would be
unlikely to proliferate, flourish, and solidify.
Fifth, many authors see solidarity as something that is directed mostly towards
vulnerable people [56, 57]. The role vulnerability plays in our framework hinges on
the notion of similarity. One of the core features of solidarity is that it foregrounds
similarities between people, and that these similarities are determined by the specifics
of a concrete practice or setting. As argued above, while two people, or members of
different groups, may be very different in many respects, one single similarity, if it
matters enough in a concrete situation, can give rise to solidarity. If we have, for
example, experienced a serious illness earlier in our lives, we may donate money and
provide other means of support to others who suffer from the same disease, even if we
have never met them in person and they live on the other side of the world. The shared
experience of living with this illness becomes a defining moment in our practice of
solidarity, even though there may be nothing else that we see ourselves having in
common with the people whom we are helping. The shared experience is what makes
us assist these people. This assistance, in turn, is typically something that affirms,
helps, or supports others, and not something that harms them. It is in this sense that
vulnerability matters. Despite the fact that whatmotivates our action is a commonality
that we consider ourselves sharing with others, in the concrete situation in which
solidarity is enacted, it is they, and not us, who are in need of support. That they are
vulnerable and in need of support in this moment thus determines the direction of the
support in the concrete instance of solidarity. But it does not change the fact that
commonality between us, and not our differences, gives rise to our action.
Sixth, many authors see reciprocity as closely related to, or even synonymous
with, solidarity. Indeed, the relationship between these concepts is such that for
solidarity to grow and institutionalise, a certain level of reciprocity is required. But
how exactly does reciprocity support the practice and institutionalisation of
solidarity? As mentioned above, if reciprocity is the decisive or even the only
motivation for a practice, then this practice should be called solidaristic. But
particularly at higher levels of institutionalisation, indirect reciprocity can play an
important role for stabilising solidaristic arrangements, and overall attitudes of
reciprocity will help maintain and enliven solidaristic policies and laws.
This understanding of solidarity shares elements with definitions from other
authors, and includes some features that resonate with the historical understandings
briefly introduced in our first section above. However, at the same time, this
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conceptualization serves to divest the concept of solidarity of some of the more
overtly partisan connotations it has been associated with in the past. In our
understanding, solidarity is not an intrinsic good or a ‘leftist’ ideal; neither is it tied
to or emergent from a particular understanding of a nation state or the common
good. The normative value of the concept as such—independent of its concrete
instantiations—is that it appreciates and facilitates non-calculating mutual support.
As such, and possibly in contrast to more particularistic understandings of
solidarity, this concept lends itself well to guiding policy and practice to address
issues with global relevance.
In the next section, we provide an example of how solidarity can guide policy in
an area that is of increasing relevance locally and globally, namely, the mitigation of
harms emerging from the use of personal data. We argue that this solidarity-based
governance framework can be fruitfully implemented on both sides of the Atlantic,
irrespective of the differences in doctrinal and cultural stances on the political value
of solidarity.
Solidarity in practice: the establishment of harm mitigation funds
for personal data use
Digital data and ‘big data’ analyses and epistemologies are playing an increasingly
important role in medical practice and medical research. Whether we call it
‘personalised’ or ‘precision’ medicine, or whether we are skeptical of any of these
concepts, it is clear that the trend in medicine is towards data-driven research and
practice [58–60]. Moreover, data will increasingly come not only from the usual
places, e.g., medical research and the clinic, but also from others such as public
archives, people’s personal devices, etc. This is especially so as combining and
linking different datasets has become much easier.
How we govern data use is thus a more important question than it has ever been.
Policy makers are recognising this. In the European Union, a new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) will come into effect in 2018. It will expand people’s
right to control who collects and uses data, including the right to have personal data
deleted in some circumstances. Such recognition is important, but, we argue, more
is needed. Many data governance frameworks rely on distinctions that no longer
work in the digital era. First, in a time when data and datasets can be copied, linked,
and shared more easily than ever, the distinction between identified and anonymised
data is no longer firm; almost any dataset is potentially identifiable when linked with
sufficient numbers and types of other datasets. Similarly, data most likely to harm
data subjects if put to unauthorised use were previously categorized separately as
‘sensitive’ data. Typical examples were medical information, information on sexual
orientation, and religious or political affiliations. Today, virtually any dataset can
harm data subjects and others if used against them. In the case of consumer scoring,
for example, seemingly innocuous pieces of information about a person can lead to
the person being profiled as high-risk of defaulting on a mortgage or overusing
emergency rooms if the analysis of large datasets has shown that these
characteristics correlate with higher risk at the aggregate level [61, 62]. Also,
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because even the most innocuous piece of information—such as where people shop
or in what postcode they live—can be used in health-related contexts (e.g., to mark
people who are more likely to be ‘expensive’ patients), any dataset is potentially
health-relevant. In short, any and all data are now potentially identifiable, health-
related, and sensitive.
Given these developments, should the use and integration of personal data in
biomedicine be even more strictly regulated? We argue that this would be the wrong
approach. There are many benefits to increased data use and analysis in
biomedicine. However, it would be wrong to believe that one can carry out a
comprehensive risk assessment a priori. It is the use of data for certain purposes, not
the nature of the data, that makes them more (or less) likely to harm data subjects.
We believe that a solidarity-based perspective can help to develop a governance
framework that responds to this challenge, while allowing the kinds of data usage
we want to support to further the improvement of clinical care and biomedical
research. At the same time, it would help to ensure that those who allow their data
to be used for public benefit are not left alone when something goes wrong. Such a
governance framework would mandate a differentiation between data use in the
public interest and data use that is not in the public interest. Building upon and
expanding the definition of public value expressed by participants in a large
Wellcome Trust study [63, p. 9], we consider data use to be in the public interest if it
will plausibly have clear benefits for many patients, society as a whole, or future
generations, and no person or group will experience significant harm. Moreover,
public interest is more pronounced if the benefits are likely to materialise for
underprivileged groups than for privileged people, due to the overall lower baseline
and potential size of impact (underprivileged groups usually benefit more from
public action; we leave out cases where this might not be so). An example for data
use in the public interest is the analysis of clinical datasets to see the commonalities
shared by patients who recover particularly fast after a specific surgery. An example
of data use that is not in the public interest would be targeted marketing.
It is important to note that we are talking about data use here, not data collection;
the question of public interest is not a property of the data themselves, but of the
context and purpose of their use. In practice, a solidarity-based approach to data use
governance entails the following steps. First, the risk for unauthorised3 re-
identification for all sets of data, regardless of the purpose for which they are
collected and used, should be decreased where meaningfully and reasonably
possible (e.g., by using privacy-by-design or privacy-by-default models). As a
second step, the exchange and analysis of data for purposes that are in the public
interest should be made easier. This would mean making regular use of instruments
such as broad consent or ‘consent to be governed’ [64], in combination with
oversight by independent governance boards. It would also mean bidding farewell to
the illusion that greater individual control over data use at every step of the process
is the best way to address the ethics of digital data use.
3 Our emphasis here is on the word unauthorised; in some cases re-identification is not problematic or
even desired (e.g., people who make data available on platforms such as DNA.land or OpenHumans). Not
every instance of re-identification of de-identified data is unauthorised, and not even every unauthorised
re-identification leads to harm.
Thinking ethical and regulatory frameworks in medicine…
123
In addition to these steps, we also propose the establishment of harm mitigation
funds [40, 52, 54]. A harm mitigation fund would be an institution governed by
people who are independent of the organisations using data (the ‘data controller’, in
the nomenclature of the GDPR) and who review appeals from people who claim to
have been harmed by data use. Harm mitigation funds could make positive
decisions on appeal even when no laws or rules are broken.
It is important to note that harm mitigation funds are not intended to replace
existing legal instruments. They would exist to complement, not replace, legal
provisions, and would not affect any statutory rights of individuals. Compared with
legal instruments, harm mitigation would be a more flexible instrument, designed to
accommodate the specific circumstances in which harm resulting from data use has,
or is believed to have, occurred. This does not mean, however, that decisions made
by harm mitigation funds would be arbitrary. A firm set of questions and indicators
would guide (but not determine) the assessment. These questions and indicators
would be made transparent and easily accessible. Harm mitigation policies would
also include categories of eligible harm, indicators to assess causality, criteria to
assess severity of harm, clear mechanisms of compensation or other responses (e.g.,
issuing of public apologies, data user feedback systems to prevent the recurrence of
harms, etc.), and most importantly, transparent rules on the qualifications of people
serving on governance boards, on term limits, and on resolving conflicts of interest.
To the best of our knowledge, such instruments have not yet been implemented.
There are, however, precursers of this type of governance, such as German
‘registered societies’ (eingetragener Verein).
Moreover, in addition to providing financial support to people who are harmed by
data use, harm mitigation funds would provide feedback to data users (and where
appropriate, regulators) on how systems and governance frameworks could be
improved. The funds for harm mitigation could come from a small portion of a
project or institution’s budget or from taxation. Harm mitigation funds could be
established at the level of individual institutions or organisations, or they could
cover a region or nation. Importantly, harm mitigation funds would hear appeals not
only from people who feel they are harmed by the use of their own data but also by
use of other people’s data.4
Conclusion
The establishment of harm mitigation funds—if enacted in the public interest,
introduced transparently, and with the requirements of general risk minimisation
described above—deviates from the current emphasis on addressing risk by
expanding individuals’ control over their data at every step of the way, an approach
that we believe is ineffective for avoiding or mitigating harm at the personal and
societal level. Our approach, in contrast, entails the acceptance of the impossibility
of eliminating all the risks of modern data usage. A solidarity-based framework
accepts the existence of risks, and assumes that many are willing to take those risks
4 See, e.g., Mark Taylor’s work on the rights of secondary data subjects [65].
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to support others with whom they recognise a relevant similarity. Harm mitigation
funds help to ensure that people who accept such risks and are harmed as a result
have appropriate support. To our minds, this responds to the need to enable
solidaristic, pro-social practices and policies to be more explicitly recognised and
fostered in current health policy and beyond.
Additionally, as introduced above, the idea of solidarity underlying harm
mitigation funds is well suited for application to issues that are increasingly
regarded as globally relevant. Usage of (digital) data in various forms is rapidly on
the rise, and by its very nature, does not conform to national borders. This is also the
case, increasingly, in other areas of health care, medicine, and research, due to the
ever-increasing mobility and interconnectedness of patients, expertise, and knowl-
edge. To respond to the resulting challenges, ‘localised’ ideas and approaches, such
as distinctly European or Anglo-American principles, values, frameworks, etc., will
likely have to be complemented by those that transcend locality, or be reframed with
a view to more transnational application. Solidarity, notwithstanding its European
heritage, is a concept that has a wide range of application from the local and
particular to the broad and global [66]. Therefore, we believe that regulatory
elements based on solidarity, such as the harm mitigation funds introduced in this
article, can usefully be implemented on both sides of the Atlantic.
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